docs: fix README OCPP 2.0.x notes with spec-verified FR references

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 6ec8b1afcf7fbdd59b749ebda6644c2300e3ba04..dd189303d568604e296435eccc9d006244cd2612 100644 (file)
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -496,8 +496,6 @@ make SUBMODULES_INIT=true
 
 ### Version 2.0.x
 
-> **Note**: OCPP 2.0.x Core profile mandatory commands are now implemented.
-
 #### A. Security
 
 - :white_check_mark: SecurityEventNotification
@@ -511,7 +509,7 @@ make SUBMODULES_INIT=true
 - :white_check_mark: SetNetworkProfile
 - :white_check_mark: SetVariables
 
-> **Note**: `SetNetworkProfile` validates `configurationSlot` and returns `Accepted` for valid requests per B09.FR.01. The simulator does not perform actual network profile switching. SecurityProfile downgrade detection (B09.FR.04) and slot-in-priority cross-check (B09.FR.05) are not implemented.
+> **Note**: `SetNetworkProfile` validates and accepts valid requests but does not persist the connection profile data (B09.FR.01).
 
 #### C. Authorization
 
@@ -547,21 +545,12 @@ make SUBMODULES_INIT=true
 - :white_check_mark: GetLog
 - :white_check_mark: LogStatusNotification
 
-> **Note**: `GetLog` triggers a simulated async lifecycle (`Uploading` → `Uploaded`) with `LogStatusNotification` updates.
-
 #### L. FirmwareManagement
 
 - :white_check_mark: FirmwareStatusNotification
 - :white_check_mark: UpdateFirmware
 
-> **Note**: `UpdateFirmware` implements a full simulated lifecycle (`DownloadScheduled` → `Downloading` → `Downloaded` → `SignatureVerified` → `InstallScheduled` → `Installing` → `Installed`) with `FirmwareStatusNotification` at each stage. Additional behaviors:
->
-> - Firmware signing certificate PEM validation with `SecurityEventNotification` on failure
-> - Active transactions block firmware update (`TxInProgress`)
-> - `retrieveDateTime`/`installDateTime` scheduling support
-> - Invalid firmware location URL detection (`DownloadFailed`)
-> - Duplicate update cancellation via `AcceptedCanceled` status
-> - `SecurityEventNotification` (`FirmwareUpdated`) on completion
+> **Note**: Firmware signature verification required by L01.FR.04 always succeeds (`SignatureVerified`). `retries`/`retryInterval` parameters are accepted but not honored.
 
 #### M. ISO 15118 CertificateManagement
 
@@ -573,21 +562,13 @@ make SUBMODULES_INIT=true
 - :white_check_mark: InstallCertificate
 - :white_check_mark: SignCertificate
 
-> **Note**: Certificate management implementation details:
->
-> - **Real PKCS#10 CSR generation**: `SignCertificate` generates a real Certificate Signing Request (RFC 2986) using RSA 2048-bit keys and SHA-256 signature via `node:crypto`
-> - **X.509 certificate validation**: `CertificateSigned` and `InstallCertificate` validate certificate validity period (`notBefore`/`notAfter`) and issuer presence per A02.FR.06. Full chain-of-trust hierarchy verification is not implemented
-> - **MaxCertificateChainSize enforcement**: `CertificateSigned` rejects certificate chains exceeding the configured `MaxCertificateChainSize` with `SecurityEventNotification` per A02.FR.16
-> - **ChargingStationCertificate protection**: `DeleteCertificate` prevents deletion of the Charging Station Certificate per M04.FR.06
-> - **OCSP stub**: `GetCertificateStatus` forwards the OCSP request data to the CSMS but does not contact an external OCSP responder. Full OCSP integration would require external responder configuration and network access
+> **Note**: Certificate hierarchy verification required by A02.FR.06 is not implemented; only validity period is checked.
 
 #### N. CustomerInformation
 
 - :white_check_mark: CustomerInformation
 - :white_check_mark: NotifyCustomerInformation
 
-> **Note**: `CustomerInformation` validates N09.FR.09 (exactly one customer identifier required when `report=true`). Report responses are sent via `NotifyCustomerInformation` with `seqNo`/`tbc` pagination.
-
 #### P. DataTransfer
 
 - :white_check_mark: DataTransfer