X-Git-Url: https://git.piment-noir.org/?p=deb_xorg-server.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=debian%2Fpatches%2FCVE-2014-8xxx%2F0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch;fp=debian%2Fpatches%2FCVE-2014-8xxx%2F0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch;h=b5fbb7dd5e88be230a8474156ed884c22b9903e8;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hb=7217e0ca50bba73dad94782e67980aeeb24ab693;hpb=a09e091a5c996d46a398abb27b06fe504591673f

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5fbb7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From d2f5bd2c3e3cbe4778749d457550355d344ca62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 18:54:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 01/33] unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash
+ Xserver [CVE-2014-8091]
+
+authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the
+connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order
+to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted.
+
+It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly
+allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server
+fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len
+field is a CARD16 in the X protocol).
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ os/rpcauth.c |    4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/os/rpcauth.c b/os/rpcauth.c
+index d60ea35..413cc61 100644
+--- a/os/rpcauth.c
++++ b/os/rpcauth.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ authdes_ezdecode(const char *inmsg, int len)
+     SVCXPRT xprt;
+ 
+     temp_inmsg = malloc(len);
++    if (temp_inmsg == NULL) {
++        why = AUTH_FAILED; /* generic error, since there is no AUTH_BADALLOC */
++        return NULL;
++    }
+     memmove(temp_inmsg, inmsg, len);
+ 
+     memset((char *) &msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+-- 
+1.7.9.2
+