Imported Debian patch 2:1.15.1-0ubuntu2.6

[deb_xorg-server.git] / debian / patches / CVE-2014-8xxx / 0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..d5f2d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 2f605f86acec5ce853f764c41f8c737154a274f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 03/33] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092
+ 2/4]
+
+GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
+them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
+all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
+potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
+a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
+calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.
+
+This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
+lists for X access control are insane.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ os/access.c |    6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+Index: xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c
+===================================================================
+--- xorg-server-1.16.0.orig/os/access.c        2014-12-04 11:11:43.752542885 -0500
++++ xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c     2014-12-04 11:11:43.748542843 -0500
+@@ -1323,6 +1323,10 @@
+     for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
+         nHosts++;
+         n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry);
++        /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of
++           hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */
++        if (n >= 1048576)
++            break;
+     }
+     if (n) {
+         *data = ptr = malloc(n);
+@@ -1331,6 +1335,8 @@
+         }
+         for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
+             len = host->len;
++            if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n))
++                break;
+             ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family;
+             ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len;
+             ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry);