Imported Debian patch 2:1.15.1-0ubuntu2.6
[deb_xorg-server.git] / debian / patches / CVE-2014-8xxx / 0005-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0005-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0005-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..1009488
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 7d4f361a216718fc7333ab805dafdb9e5c85c180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 05/33] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE()
+ [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
+
+Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
+in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
+checks.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ include/dix.h |    3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h
+index 991a3ce..e0c6ed8 100644
+--- a/include/dix.h
++++ b/include/dix.h
+@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
+     if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
+-        (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
++        ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
++        ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len))  \
+          return(BadLength)
+ #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\
+-- 
+1.7.9.2
+