Imported Debian patch 2:1.15.1-0ubuntu2.6
[deb_xorg-server.git] / debian / patches / CVE-2014-8xxx / 0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
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1From 2f605f86acec5ce853f764c41f8c737154a274f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
3Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800
4Subject: [PATCH 03/33] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092
5 2/4]
6
7GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
8them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
9all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
10potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
11a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
12calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.
13
14This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
15lists for X access control are insane.
16
17Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
18Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
19Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
20---
21 os/access.c | 6 ++++++
22 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
23
24Index: xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c
25===================================================================
26--- xorg-server-1.16.0.orig/os/access.c 2014-12-04 11:11:43.752542885 -0500
27+++ xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c 2014-12-04 11:11:43.748542843 -0500
28@@ -1323,6 +1323,10 @@
29 for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
30 nHosts++;
31 n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry);
32+ /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of
33+ hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */
34+ if (n >= 1048576)
35+ break;
36 }
37 if (n) {
38 *data = ptr = malloc(n);
39@@ -1331,6 +1335,8 @@
40 }
41 for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
42 len = host->len;
43+ if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n))
44+ break;
45 ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family;
46 ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len;
47 ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry);