Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
7217e0ca ML |
1 | From 2f605f86acec5ce853f764c41f8c737154a274f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
2 | From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | |
3 | Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800 | |
4 | Subject: [PATCH 03/33] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 | |
5 | 2/4] | |
6 | ||
7 | GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies | |
8 | them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over | |
9 | all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a | |
10 | potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with | |
11 | a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly | |
12 | calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. | |
13 | ||
14 | This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname | |
15 | lists for X access control are insane. | |
16 | ||
17 | Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> | |
18 | Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | |
19 | Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> | |
20 | --- | |
21 | os/access.c | 6 ++++++ | |
22 | 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) | |
23 | ||
24 | Index: xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c | |
25 | =================================================================== | |
26 | --- xorg-server-1.16.0.orig/os/access.c 2014-12-04 11:11:43.752542885 -0500 | |
27 | +++ xorg-server-1.16.0/os/access.c 2014-12-04 11:11:43.748542843 -0500 | |
28 | @@ -1323,6 +1323,10 @@ | |
29 | for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { | |
30 | nHosts++; | |
31 | n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry); | |
32 | + /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of | |
33 | + hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */ | |
34 | + if (n >= 1048576) | |
35 | + break; | |
36 | } | |
37 | if (n) { | |
38 | *data = ptr = malloc(n); | |
39 | @@ -1331,6 +1335,8 @@ | |
40 | } | |
41 | for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { | |
42 | len = host->len; | |
43 | + if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) | |
44 | + break; | |
45 | ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family; | |
46 | ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len; | |
47 | ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry); |