debian/patches/CVE-2014-8xxx/0005-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch

   1 From 7d4f361a216718fc7333ab805dafdb9e5c85c180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
   2 From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
   3 Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800
   4 Subject: [PATCH 05/33] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE()
   5  [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
   6
   7 Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
   8 in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
   9 checks.
  10
  11 Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
  12 Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
  13 Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
  14 ---
  15  include/dix.h |    3 ++-
  16  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
  17
  18 --- a/include/dix.h
  19 +++ b/include/dix.h
  20 @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
  21
  22  #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
  23      if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
  24 -        (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
  25 +        ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
  26 +        ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len))  \
  27           return(BadLength)
  28
  29  #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\