ODROID-U3 xorg-server debian package fork :
[deb_xorg-server.git] / debian / patches / CVE-2014-8xxx / 0020-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch
1 From 096a5af8e52faafc38ae84dd17bede7ac03a3b83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2 From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
3 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:36 -0500
4 Subject: [PATCH 20/33] glx: Be more paranoid about variable-length requests
5 [CVE-2014-8093 1/6]
6
7 If the size computation routine returns -1 we should just reject the
8 request outright. Clamping it to zero could give an attacker the
9 opportunity to also mangle cmdlen in such a way that the subsequent
10 length check passes, and the request would get executed, thus passing
11 data we wanted to reject to the renderer.
12
13 Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
14 Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
15 Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
16 Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com>
17 Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
18 Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
19 ---
20 glx/glxcmds.c | 4 ++--
21 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
22
23 --- a/glx/glxcmds.c
24 +++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
25 @@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl,
26 extra = (*entry.varsize) (pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE,
27 client->swapped);
28 if (extra < 0) {
29 - extra = 0;
30 + return BadLength;
31 }
32 if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + extra)) {
33 return BadLength;
34 @@ -2169,7 +2169,7 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState *
35 extra = (*entry.varsize) (pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE,
36 client->swapped);
37 if (extra < 0) {
38 - extra = 0;
39 + return BadLength;
40 }
41 /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */
42 if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + 4 + extra)) {